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Abstract 
The maternity benefit scheme introduced as Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY) in 2011 
and renamed Pradhan Mantri Matriva Sahyog Yojana (PMMVY) in 2017, which incentivizes pregnant 
and lactating women to participate in various infant health-promoting activities, is India’s largest 
conditional cash transfer program thus far. We approach IGMSY’s geographically targeted pilot phase 
as a natural experiment and use data from a large national health survey to estimate its effects by a 
matched-pair differences-in-differences approach. Consistent with the program’s objectives we find 
positive, albeit small effects on infant immunization as well as long-term health care utilization. In 
addition, intervals between eligible births increase by 15 percent. Our findings suggest that PMMVY is 
moderately cost-effective, at least regarding immunization, but that it will make only a small 
contribution to redressing India’s dismal child-health record. 
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1. Introduction  
While there has been considerable progress in the worldwide reduction of child mortality, 
absolute mortality remains high, with more than 15,000 children under five perishing each day 
(WHO 2018b). The majority of these deaths occur in low and middle income countries (LMICs) 
(WHO 2018a), which also lag behind in terms of health risk and disease burden (Black et al. 
2008; WHO 2009). Eighty percent of under-five child deaths in LMICs are caused by 
communicable diseases as well as perinatal and nutritional conditions (WHO 2018a). While 
many communicable diseases can be prevented by vaccination, immunization rates as high as 
95 percent are necessary in order to locally eliminate an illness (Andre et al. 2008), a number 
that has not yet been reached by most LMICs (WHO 2018b). Perinatal conditions contribute 
to persisting deficits in child health owing to an intergenerational vicious cycle in which 
unhealthy mothers are more likely to give birth to unhealthy children (Black et al. 2008). In 
turn, poor health, nutrition and health care in early childhood affect long-term physical and 
cognitive development (Currie 2009; Maluccio and Flores 2005; Maluccio et al. 2009; Miguel 
and Kremer 2004), which is again related to poor maternal health.  
For these reasons, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the ensuing Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) have emphasized universal vaccination coverage, and maternal and 
child health. After most LMICs had fallen short of the MDG’s targeted reduction of maternal 
and infant mortality (United Nations Development Program 2015), many governments have 
sought novel ways to strengthen maternal and child health to ensure progress toward the 
SDGs. A popular measure in this connection have been conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programs, which have been adopted by numerous LMICs (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). While 
these can in principle support mothers during the critical phase of pregnancy and childbirth, 
and incentivize health-enhancing behavior, few explicitly target pregnant women 
(Ranganathan and Lagarde 2012). 
One scheme which is tailored to the needs of women and children in the critical phase around 
delivery is India’s maternity benefit scheme introduced in 2011 as Indira Gandhi Matritva 
Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY) and renamed Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana (PMMVY) in 
2017. In terms of expenditures, IGMSY/PMMVY has become India’s largest CCT program 
ever. The program was introduced at a time when India showed marked deficits in health 
service use and poor child health outcomes. In particular, in a comparison of 16 indicators of 
health service coverage around the year 2010, India ranked below the world median in 15 of 
these (WHO 2012). The country’s performance with respect to child nutritional outcomes has 
been particularly desolate: India had the third and second highest percentage of low birth 
weight and underweight children below five years of age out of 119 and 109 countries, 
respectively (WHO 2012). During its five-year long pilot phase, IGMSY offered cash transfers 
for all pregnant and lactating women aged 19 and older for their first and second live births in 
selected districts (Ministry of Women and Child Development 2011) provided they complied 
with several maternal- and child-health-related conditions.  
In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive impact evaluation of the IGMSY/PMMVY program 
using a large, nationally representative sample from the fourth wave of India’s National Family 
Health Survey (NFHS-4). Our focus is on fertility, maternal health, health care use, 
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immunization, child health and mortality. The extended pilot phase of five years and the timing 
of the survey, which was fielded four years after IGMSY’s introduction, provide the unique 
opportunity to also estimate medium-term effects of a CCT whose cash transfers end six 
months after a child’s birth.  
We approach IGMSY’s pilot phase as a natural experiment employing a matched-pair 
differences-in-differences estimator. We exploit the feature that the 52 pilot districts were 
selected based on district scores computed from a previous health survey to identify 52 control 
districts, one for each pilot district. We estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) effects of the program 
by comparing the within-district difference in health outcomes between younger birth cohorts 
exposed to the program and older cohorts not exposed to IGMSY across pilot and control 
districts.  
Consistent with IGMSY’s objectives, we find that the program increases complete infant 
immunizations by nine percent and mothers of once eligible children report fourteen percent 
more contacts with the government health system three to four years later. We also find 
substantially longer birth intervals for low parities of more than ten percent. Despite these 
improvements in health inputs, we find no robust evidence of gains in health outcomes, albeit 
some of our results suggest improvements in child mortality and weight-related outcomes for 
both children and mothers. An analysis of heterogeneous program effects suggests that girls 
benefit disproportionately regarding vaccinations. The lack of conclusiveness regarding health 
outcomes is partly owed to limited estimation precision, which arises from the relatively small 
geographic scope of IGMSY’s pilot phase. 
Overall, our evaluation shows a mixed record, with solid improvements in health service use 
and birth spacing, suggestive evidence for improvements in weight-related outcomes and 
mortality but no further tangible health gains. The effect on health care and immunization is 
to be commended given India’s dismal record on these indicators until the first decade of the 
21st century. Moreover, our estimates show that the program has the potential to reduce India’s 
gap to the SDG’s targeted 95 percent immunization rate by a moderate seven percent. Our 
findings also have important policy implications. In particular, they make clear that increases 
in the demand for health care incentivized by a maternal CCT are not sufficient to lastingly 
improve health outcomes in children and mothers, at least when the program fails to reach 
almost every second eligible mother. Accordingly, we argue that the outreach of such incentive 
schemes needs to be massively improved and additional policies are warranted that identify 
and tackle the causes of health risks and simultaneously raise the quality of health services.  
Studies most closely related to ours are, first, Powell-Jackson et al. (2015), who evaluate India’s 
JSY program, which pays a cash transfer conditional on institutional or assisted delivery. They 
show that JSY increases institutional delivery rates but fails to decrease perinatal mortality. 
In addition, the authors document a number of side effects of the program such as higher 
fertility, increased breastfeeding, and lower demand for private health services. Second, Ghosh 
and Kochar (2018) evaluate the IGMSY program for Bihar, India’s most destitute state, where 
the program was poorly implemented. Despite inordinate delays in cash transfers, the authors 
find large positive effects on children's weight and birth spacing. Our contribution relative to 
that study is that we cover the majority of India’s states, the data comes from a nationally 
representative sample. Moreover,we consider important additional perinatal and infant 
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outcomes, namely birthweight, anemia and mortality, vaccination and other health service use, 
as well as maternal health. Further, we uncover some important heterogeneous program effects. 
Our study also contributes new evidence and adds a new regional focus to a broader literature 
on the effectiveness of conditional cash transfer programs, specifically in the context of child 
and maternal health. This literature has delivered plenty of evidence for substantial effects of 
cash incentives on health-service use (Ranganathan and Lagarde 2012; Grépin et al. 2019). 
However, studies of CCTs geared at promoting infant immunization have been conducted only 
in some Latin American countries (Lagarde et al. 2009).2 Evidence on the impact of CCTs on 
maternal health is scarce, with one study documenting only insignificant effects for Mexico’s 
Progresa/Oportunidades program on anemia (Glassman et al. 2017). Regarding the effect of 
CCTs on child health, the extant literature reports inconclusive evidence. For five Latin 
American CCT programs, Ranganathan and Lagarde (2012) document positive effects on 
height-related measures, predominantly positive effects on weight-related measures and mixed 
evidence for anemia. Impacts of CCT programs in Indonesia, Uruguay and Mexico on 
birthweight have been found to be positive, but the effects are mostly small and often 
insignificant (Amarante et al. 2011; Barber and Gertler 2010; Triyana 2016). Evidence on the 
effect of CCTs on child mortality is largely absent in the literature, particularly for South Asia 
(Glassman et al. 2013; Hunter et al. 2017), with the exception of the aforementioned study by 
Powell-Jackson et al. (2015).   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the IGMSY/PMMVY 
program and discusses anticipated effects. Section 3 lays out our empirical strategy. Section 4 
describes the data and presents balancing tests. Results are in section 5 and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 The IGMSY/PMMVY conditional cash transfer program 
The Indian government started a first mother-and-child-health-related conditional cash 
transfer program in 2005 for incentivizing safe deliveries. This program, the Janani Suraksha 
Yojana (JSY), which literally translated means Safe Motherhood Scheme, pays a one-time cash 
transfer to mothers conditional on institutional delivery or skilled assistance for delivery at 
home. It was partially motivated by the fifth millennium development goal (MDG), to improve 
maternal health, whereby one of two progress indicators is the proportion of births attended 
by skilled personnel (United Nations Development Program 2015). This program has not been 
universal: while all births of mothers have been eligible for a transfer of ₹ (rupees) 1,400 in 
rural and ₹ 1,000 in urban areas of ten comparatively poor states, only the first two births of 
mothers in below-the-poverty-line households or from disadvantaged social groups have been 
eligible for ₹ 700 and ₹ 600 in all other states (Lim et al. 2010). While the said MDG indicator 
                                                          
2 However, in a small-scale randomized intervention in rural Rajasthan, conditional in-kind gifts vastly 
increased village child immunization rates (Banerjee et al. 2019). 
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improved rapidly, from 46.6 percent in 2005/06 to 81.4 percent in 2015/16 (Ministry of 
Statistics and Programme Implementation 2017, 2011), policymakers recognized that 
complications during delivery are not the only risk to maternal and child health (Ministry of 
Women and Child Development 2011). JSY fails to cover the wage loss of mothers, which may 
prevent their rest and adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation. Furthermore, it does 
not incentivize mothers to engage in behavioral practices beneficial to both mother and child 
that go beyond safe delivery, such as adequate nutrition or preventive health care such as 
vaccination (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2011b). 
The Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana (Indira Gandhi Motherhood Support Scheme) has 
been an attempt to fill this gap. It aims to improve maternal and infant health through a 
conditional cash support during the time of pregnancy and lactation. Unlike JSY, this program 
has been universal in the program’s pilot districts, covering the first two live births of all 
women with the exception of government employees. The cash benefit of initially ₹ 4,000 
(approximately US$ 65) is equivalent to 7.3 (6.0) times the monthly rural (urban) poverty line 
or 31 female unskilled agricultural daily wages in 2011. It is funded by the national government 
via the state and district branches of the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS). 
During its early years, the transfer has been sent to the mother’s bank account in three 
installments: at the last trimester of the pregnancy and three and six months after the delivery, 
conditional on the program conditions. 
All activities related to the conditions of IGMSY take place at local primary health care centers, 
known as Anganwadi centers. Compliance with the program’s conditions is monitored there 
and the Anganwadi staff also receive a monetary incentive of ₹ 100 to 200 per completed case. 
Apart from one antenatal check-up and tetanus immunization for mothers, IGMSY directly 
incentivizes three child immunizations: one dose of BCG (Bacillus Calmette-Guérin), which 
protects primarily against tuberculosis, and three doses of polio and DPT (diphtheria, pertussis 
and tetanus) vaccine, respectively. In addition, IGMSY features various nutrition-related 
conditions: during pregnancy mothers have to collect iron and folic acid (IFA) tablets and 
attend a nutrition and health counseling session. After the delivery, the child’s weight is to be 
recorded four times and the mother has to participate in four counseling sessions.3  
With more than 1.3 million Anganwadi centers all over the country, the public primary health 
care infrastructure necessary to fulfill the program conditions is dense and, at least in principle, 
free of charge. In addition, part of the government’s budget allocation for IGMSY has been 
dedicated to hiring of additional staff in Anganwadi centers of pilot districts, to prevent an 
undersupply of the incentivized services (PBI 2010). 
                                                          
3 The comprehensive conditions and timing of the cash transfers under the original scheme are 
provided in Table A1 in the appendix. 
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During a pilot phase, the program was geographically targeted and implemented in only 52 of 
India’s 640 districts (Ministry of Women and Child Development 2019).4 Unlike the majority 
of geographically targeted welfare programs in India, the pilot phase of IGMSY has not focused 
on the country’s most destitute areas. Instead, a deliberate attempt was made to identify a set 
of districts representative of the country as a whole. The following stratified selection procedure 
was employed (Ghosh and Kochar 2018; Ministry of Women and Child Development 2011): 
First, an index of six health and development indicators was calculated from the third round 
of the District Level Household and Facility Survey (DLHS-3), fielded in 2007 and 2008. 
Second, according to this index, all 640 districts of India were categorized as either low, medium 
or high-performing. From these three groups, the pilot districts were randomly selected; eleven 
from each of the high and low-performing categories, and twenty-six from the medium-
performance category. The remaining four districts were union territories (UTs).  
In October 2010, the program was approved for implementation by the central government 
with budgetary allocations of ₹ 3.9 and ₹ 6.1 billion for the fiscal years 2010/11 and 2011/12 
(PBI 2010). According to our calculations, the latter amount corresponds to roughly ₹ 4,600 
per eligible birth. The actual implementation of the scheme started not before April 2011: 
program guidelines were agreed upon between the center and the states in April 2011 and 
training of implementation staff on the ground was scheduled for late May 2011 (Ministry of 
Women and Child Development 2011). Moreover, transfers from the central to the state 
governments were in some cases delayed until September 2011 (Sinha et al. 2016). For the pilot 
districts included in our analysis, state expenditures per eligible child on IGMSY were only ₹ 
6 in 2010/11, rising to 3,190 in 2011/12 and 3,438 in 2012/13.5 Only one state (Meghalaya) 
spent any funds in 2010. Despite identical numbers of target beneficiaries in 2011 and 2012, 
the amount of funds expended by state governments in 2011 was only half of what was spent 
in 2012 (Falcao et al. 2015). This suggests that the program was up and running only in the 
second half of the financial year 2011/12. As a consequence, there have been virtually no 
beneficiaries in the fiscal year 2010/11. In the following two fiscal years, about 28 and 59 
percent of the 1.2 million target beneficiaries were reached (Falcao et al. 2015). In 2013/14, 
the cash transfer increased from ₹ 4,000 to ₹ 6,000 (implying expenditures of ₹ 8,458 per 
eligible child) and was paid in two rather than three installments.  
In 2017, the program was renamed Pradhan Mantri Matritva Vandana Yojana (PMMVY), in 
English the Prime Minister’s Reverence for Maternity Scheme, and expanded to all districts of 
India with a cash transfer of ₹ 5,000 per woman paid in three installments, two during 
pregnancy and one after. Only the first live birth is eligible under PMMVY. There are two 
stated objectives of this program. First, to provide “partial compensation for the wage loss […] 
so that the woman can take adequate rest before and after delivery” and second, that “the 
cash incentive provided would lead to improved health seeking behavior amongst the pregnant 
                                                          
4 Due to the separation of Kundagaon from the pilot district Bastar, this number increased to 53 
districts in 2012. 
5 For our definition of program expenditure per eligible case and data sources see appendix A2. 
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women and lactating mothers” (PBI 2017), in particular, safe delivery and immunization of 
firstborn children (PBI 2019).  
In terms of expenditures, with a budget allocation in 2017/18 of 27 billion rupees (US$ 400 
million), PMMVY is India’s largest conditional cash transfer program ever, accounting for 12 
percent of the Ministry of Women and Child Development’s budget or 0.13 percent of 
government expenditures. In comparison, the older JSY program, which has paid a maximum 
of ₹ 2,000 for an institutional delivery as of 2015, had a budget allocation of 20 billion rupees 
in 2017/18. On the other hand, according to administrative data, JSY reached out to 10.0 
million women during the financial year 2018/19, while there were not more than 7.5 million 
beneficiaries under PMMVY. Still, unlike the IGMSY pilot, PMMVY appears underfunded 
relative to the program entitlements. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that twice 
the allocated budget would be needed to adequately fund the roughly 9.5 million first births in 
India in 2018. 
2.2 Anticipated effects 
In the following, we discuss how we expect the different elements of IGMSY to affect maternal 
and child health. We draw on Gaarder et al. (2010), who develop a theory of change for the 
impact of health-related CCTs, which we adapt to the setting of perinatal health and the 
Indian social context (see Figure 1).  
First, conditions for the receipt of cash transfers may directly incentivize healthy behaviors in 
the form of increased demand for maternal and child health inputs. In the case of IGMSY, the 
program conditions not only directly mandate vaccinations but also require the repeated 
interaction with a health worker. This raises the probability of prevention, early detection and 
treatment of health deficiencies in mothers and children. Second, IGMSY may indirectly 
promote healthy behaviors and birth spacing decisions through information conveyed in the 
incentivized educational sessions (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2011a). Third, there 
can be an income effect due to the cash transfer, whose funds are likely to be spent on additional 
healthcare and food during the critical phase of pregnancy, childbirth and lactation 
(Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000). Fourth, the additional income may also contribute to 
maternal health by reducing the labor supply of beneficiary women during pregnancy. On the 
other hand, the cash transfer can serve as an unintended incentive for impatient parents to 
reduce the birth interval between the first and second child (Powell-Jackson et al. 2015). Short 
birth spacing in turn contributes to adverse health outcomes for children and mothers (Cleland 
et al. 2012). Finally, the expansion of health service supply, which has been part of IGMSY, 
may lift access barriers to health care and thus increase health care use regardless of the cash 
transfer or its conditions. 
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In sum, regarding birth spacing, we anticipate two opposing effects: a positive one from 
trainings and more frequent interactions with the government health system which strongly 
promotes family planning, as well as a greater focus of parents on child quality rather than 
quantity; and, at least for the first birth interval, a negative one from the prospect of extra 
cash for the next pregnancy. We expect an unambiguous positive effect on health service use, 
in particular vaccination, and maternal health. While the literature suggests large gains in 
child health and mortality through these outcomes in the long term (WHO 2010), immediate 
effects on indicators of perinatal service use and health may or may not exceed long-term effects 
as the immediate impact of the CCT may become diluted as time passes. In particular, effects 
on maternal health will likely dissipate faster than children’s, as in utero and infant health has 
been shown to be particularly critical for longer-term health.  
Of course, the program’s impacts on different population groups may vary. If, due to poor 
implementation, the cash transfer does not reach eligible mothers, this will mitigate the 
program’s effect on the children concerned. Similarly, individual and household characteristics 
likely play a role for the program’s effectiveness. We expect traditionally disadvantaged 
households – those that are poor, from a scheduled caste or tribe (SC/ST) or living in the rural 
areas (Balarajan et al. 2011) – to profit more from the program (Gaarder et al. 2010), unless 
these characteristics restrict their access to the program (Powell-Jackson and Hanson 2012). 
In addition, effects may disproportionately benefit girls as Indian parents tend to invest more 
in boys’ than in girls’ health (Asfaw et al. 2010). Furthermore, we hypothesize that benefits 
are concentrated on first- and second-born children if the eligibility rules are enforced. 
 
Figure 1: Theory of change 
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3. Empirical approach 
We approach the pilot phase of the program as a natural experiment. Similar to the 
methodology of Ghosh and Kochar (2018), we elicit intention-to-treat effects (ITT) of IGMSY 
through a matched-pairs difference-in-difference approach. We compare the effect of the 
program on children that were eligible for the program and those that were not along two 
dimensions: first by taking the difference between eligible and ineligible cohorts within each 
district and second by comparing pilot to control districts.  
We identify one control district for each pilot district through a matched-pair design. First, we 
recalculate for all districts the health development index used by the Indian government to 
select pilot districts, based on data from DLHS-3 reports (IIPS 2010). Index scores of all 
districts in our analysis are set out in Table A2 of the appendix. Next, we select within each 
state the nearest neighbor of each pilot district in terms of this index.6   
                                                          
6 For the selection of control districts within states we treat Telangana, which separated from Andhra 
Pradesh in 2014, as part of Andhra Pradesh. 
Figure 2: Matched pairs of pilot and control districts 
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Ghosh and Kochar (2018) report that pilot districts were chosen randomly. If the selection of 
pilot districts within each stratum were non-random but driven by political or need 
considerations, however, this could bias naïve cross-sectional estimates of the program’s effect. 
Our empirical approach addresses this concern in two ways, first by selecting control districts 
that are most similar to the program districts according to a pre-determined score. Second, in 
addition to the cross-sectional comparison, we also compare across exposed and not-exposed 
birth cohorts within each district. Differences between the latter are very unlikely to be affected 
by administrative selection as both types of cohorts are born subsequent to the program’s 
planning stage in early 2010. 
In principle, all women who fulfilled the eligibility criteria in December 2010 and thereafter 
were eligible to receive IGMSY benefits (Ministry of Women and Child Development 2011). 
However, given that the training of the ICDS staff was scheduled to be completed no earlier 
than June 2010, we expect registration of beneficiaries, which is possible until the fourth month 
of pregnancy, not to have started much before August 2011. As a consequence, the first cohort 
of children that profited from IGMSY would be born five months later in January 2012. 
Therefore, our estimator compares the difference in outcomes of children born in 2011 or earlier 
to children born in 2012 or later within pilot districts to the same difference in control districts 
of the same state. Due to the fuzzy onset of the program and our conservative approach by 
which some children in the control cohort might already have had access to the program, our 
estimator delivers a lower bound of the actual program effect.   
Our key regression equation is 
𝐻௦ௗ௜௧ = 𝛼௦ௗ + µ௧ + (𝛿௦  ×  𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ௧)  +  𝛽(𝑃௦ௗ × 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ௧)  + 𝛾𝑋௦ௗ௜௧ + 𝑢௦ௗ௜௧, (1) 
where 𝑠 indexes states, 𝑑 districts, 𝑖 children and 𝑡 birth year; 𝐻௦ௗ௧௜ is an outcome of interest;  
𝑃௦ௗ is a dummy variable indicating whether a child lives in a program (or pilot) district; 
𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ௧ specifies whether a child was born in 2012 or later; 𝑋௦ௗ௜௧ is a vector of individual 
and household-level control variables;7  𝛼௦ௗ and µ௧ are district and birth year fixed effects, 
respectively: the former account for cohort-independent differences between districts (thus 
absorbing cohort-independent differences between program and control districts); the 
latter capture average cohort-specific differences between children common to both pilot and 
control districts (and thus includes spatially independent differences between children born 
before and after the program’s onset). The term 𝛿௦  ×  𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ௧ captures state-specific time 
trends and 𝑢 is a stochastic error term. The coefficient 𝛽 gives the ITT effect of IGMSY. In 
line with common practice, we cluster standard errors at the level at which program status 
varies, the district (Abadie et al. 2017). The empirical approach to estimate the effect on 
mothers’ outcomes is analogous, with eligibility defined by a dummy variable that takes on a 
                                                          
7 We do not control for father’s characteristics as these are only available for a small subsample. 
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value of one if the mother gave birth to a first or second-born child in 2012 or later (for the 
detailed regression equation, see appendix A1). 
We account for the threat of falsely rejecting the null-hypothesis of no effect when estimating 
several outcome variables with the same sample by adjusting the p-values for the respective 
null hypotheses for families of outcomes as suggested by Romano and Wolf (2005). This method 
corrects for multiple inference through bootstrapping by controlling the family-wise error rate.  
4. Data 
4.1 The National Family Health Survey 
Our data source for health service use as well as health outcomes is the seventh round of the 
Indian Demographic and Health Survey (IIPS and IFG 2018), commonly known as the fourth 
National Family and Health Survey (NFHS-4). This survey of more than half a million 
households was fielded between January 2015 and December 2016. We derive our outcome and 
control variables from the children’s dataset, which contains data on 259,627 children born five 
years before the survey took place and later. This means our data covers roughly half of the 
2010 birth cohort and all children in later cohorts. We use the sampling weights included in 
the data throughout to make all figures representative for the respective populations. 
We use only a subset of the observations in the NFHS children’s module. First, to ensure that 
control districts are free from other similar programs, we eliminate states that operated 
additional state-specific and state-wide maternity benefit programs with cash transfers in 2011 
or 2012.8 Second, we exclude UTs9 and Nagaland, which were not surveyed in the DLHS-3, as 
well as Jammu and Kashmir since districts in the latter cannot be matched unequivocally with 
districts in the NFHS. Third, in accordance with IGMSY’s eligibility rules, we restrict the 
analysis to children of mothers aged at least 19 years at the time of birth of the child. Fourth, 
to make the cohorts exposed to the program as comparable as possible to the older cohorts not 
exposed to IGMSY, we focus on children born in the four years around IGMSY’s onset. Hence, 
we restrict the children’s sample to the birth cohorts 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. Finally, we 
exclude observations with a missing value among the control variables.10 We do not restrict 
our sample to the officially eligible first and second-born children due to the possibility of 
imperfect compliance with this rule. The dataset for our empirical analyses contains 13,367 
children in 70 districts (35 program and control districts each) of 24 states, which host around 
70 percent of India’s population. 
                                                          
8 These states (programs) are Madya Pradesh (Mukhyamantri Mazdoor Suraksha Yojana), 
Maharashtra (Matrutva Anudan Yojana), Odisha (Mamata) and Tamil Nadu (Dr. Muthulakshmi 
Maternity Assistance Scheme). 
9 Chhandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, Lakshadweep, Puducherry, Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands. 
10 Detailed observation numbers documenting how we arrive at our estimation sample contains Table 
A3 of the appendix. 
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4.2  Outcome variables 
The outcomes of interest we consider can be partitioned into two broad categories. First, 
intermediary outcomes through which we expect an impact on child health. These comprise 
birth spacing, maternal health, and use of health services conducive to maternal and child 
health. The latter include self-reported use of public health care as well as completion of basic 
vaccinations. The second set of outcomes are health markers of children, low birthweight 
reported by the mother, as well as anthropometric and hemoglobin measurements taken at the 
survey interview, and mortality.  
We measure birth spacing as the number of months between a child’s birth and the succeeding 
birth. For maternal health, we use health outcomes of mothers at the time of interview. 
Following the standard WHO (2011) thresholds, we code a mother as anemic if her hemoglobin 
level lies below 12g/dl (below 11 g/dl for pregnant women). We define a mother as underweight 
if her BMI falls short of 18.5. 
As we have laid out in Section 2, a central objective of IGMSY/PMMVY is to improve pregnant 
women’s and lactating mothers’ use of health services. The program’s implementation rules 
mandate that the corresponding incentivized activities – those that are conditions for obtaining 
cash transfers – are provided by Anganwadi centers. Therefore, we include all survey questions 
in the NFHS children’s dataset which literally contain the word “Anganwadi” and are 
administered either for all children aged five and younger or all women aged 15 to 49. These 
are first, the incidence of benefits from Anganwadi centers, essentially health services and 
products received by the mother during pregnancy or lactation, which we take as measures of 
antenatal and postnatal health care respectively; second, the incidence of Anganwadi benefits 
among children as well as contacts of their mothers with Anganwadi staff during the months 
preceding the survey interview, which we take as measures of the program’s medium-term 
effects on access to government health care.  
Regarding immunization, our principal interest is in the incidence of complete child 
immunization by India’s national definition, which comprises one dose of BCG, typically given 
right after birth, three shots of DPT (DPT-3) and polio (polio-3), given within the first four 
months, and one dose of measles vaccine, which should be administered after nine months at 
the earliest (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2019). Since all these vaccinations should 
be completed by the age of two at the latest, our sample, in which children are on average 
three years old, is well suited to assess complete immunization status. We also consider the 
vaccinations BCG, DPT-3, polio-3, and measles separately. Under IGMSY/PMMVY, BCG, 
DPT-3 and polio-3 are directly incentivized, while the measles immunization is beyond the 
program’s scope, which ends six months postpartum. We thus view any effects on measles 
immunization status as an indirect or spillover effect of the program.  
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We define child health outcomes following WHO standards. According to these, a child exhibits 
low birth weight if it weighs less than 2,500 grams at birth (WHO 2014). A child is underweight 
at the time of the survey if its weight-for-age z-score (WAZ), the number of standard deviations 
from the WHO reference population’s median, is smaller than -2 (WHO 2018b). Similarly, a 
child is stunted if its height-for-age z-score (HAZ) is smaller than -2. We code a child as anemic 
if its hemoglobin level falls short of 11 g/dl (WHO 2011). We focus on these binary indicators 
because they capture deprivations, whose overcoming is the ultimate policy goal. Finally, we 
measure mortality through a variable indicating whether a child is no longer alive at the time 
of interview. 
According to the summary statistics set out in Tables A5 and A6 of the appendix, the sample 
means for the districts in our research design are close to the all-India averages of the outcome 
variables (Dhirar et al. 2018). While the NFHS includes a number of measures of activities 
incentivized by IGMSY/PMMVY in addition to the ones just discussed, we choose to ignore 
them in our analysis because they are recorded only for the last delivery of a woman.  
4.3 Balancing test 
For an unbiased estimate of the program effect, children in our control and pilot districts 
should be similar with respect to outcomes  and other observable characteristics at baseline 
(Kahn-Lang and Lang 2020). We assert this in a balancing test set out in Table 1. There are 
no significant differences in outcomes and other observable characteristics between children in 
pilot and control districts before the start of the program except for the percentage of children 
with low birth weight, which is significant at the 10% level.  
Another potential threat to our identification strategy is a selection bias introduced by families 
moving from control to pilot districts in order to profit from the program. However, we find 
no effect of IGMSY on years of residence in the current location (see Table A8). 
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Table 1: Balancing test 
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5. Results 
5.1 Main Results 
We start by exploring the program’s impact on the intermediary outcomes birth spacing, 
maternal health and health service use. The results for the former are set out in Table 2. For 
first born children, column 2 documents a 17 percent decrease in the hazard rate for the 
occurrence of the second birth, which roughly corresponds to a stretching of the median 
expected birth interval between first and second births by 5.2 months. While there is also a 
significant 11 percent decrease in the birth hazard rate in the whole sample (an increase by 7.3 
months of the median interval), we obtain no significant effects for the subsamples of second-
born children, who are eligible for IGMSY benefits, and higher parities, who are not. 
 
Table 2: Program effect on birth spacing 
 
 
Table 3 includes the program effects on two health markers of mothers, underweight and 
anemia at the time of the interview. While underweight decreases by ten percent according to 
column 1, the estimated effect is not statistically different from zero due to the relatively large 
standard error.  
Table 4 contains results regarding the program’s impact on Anganwadi health service use. 
While all estimates have the expected positive sign, by far the greatest effect occurs for the 
outcome with the shortest recall period, the probability that a mother met an Anganwadi 
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worker in the three months preceding the survey interview, which increases by 13 percent. This 
result is significant at the 1% level even when adjusting for multiple inference.  
Table 3: Program effect on mothers‘ health outcomes 
 
Table 4: Program effect on Anganwadi center contact 
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Table 5 sets out the ITT effects on immunization. The coefficients all have the expected positive 
sign, with larger effects for immunizations where vaccination rates at baseline are low. Column 
5 shows that children eligible for the program are on average 9 percent more likely to be fully 
immunized. Interestingly, despite this significant overall improvement and a significant point 
estimate for polio-3 vaccination, we find no statistically significant effects for the individual 
vaccinations (columns 1 - 4) when we account for multiple inference.  
 
 
We now turn to the question whether IGMSY and the above-documented improvements in 
intermediary outcomes also improve child health. Table 6 provides estimates of the program’s 
effects on child health markers and mortality. According to column 1, the program significantly 
decreases the incidence of low birth weight by four percentage points, which equals 40 percent 
of the control group’s mean. This effect is significant at the five percent level when accounting 
for multiple inference. Following Kahn-Lang and Lang (2020), we take this result with some 
caution as the balancing test in section 4.3 shows a borderline significant positive difference 
between pilot and control districts of almost three percentage points. The program reduces 
underweight at the time of interview, when children are one to five years old, by 4.6 percentage 
points (column 2). As for low birthweight, this result is significant at the 5 percent level when 
accounting for multiple inference. According to column 5, IGMSY has a beneficial and 
relatively large effect on child mortality. On the other hand, the point estimates for stunting 
and anemia are positive (columns 3-4). However, neither of these outcomes attains statistical 
significance when accounting for multiple inference. 
Table 5: Program effect on child immunization  
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5.2 Robustness 
To assess whether the key assumption underlying our matched-pair difference-in-difference 
approach - parallel trends in outcomes absent IGMSY - is internally valid, we conduct a placebo 
test (Kahn-Lang and Lang 2020). To this end, we repeat our main analysis with data from 
India’s third District Level Household Survey, DLHS-3 (IIPS 2010), which was fielded in 2007 
and 2008, well before the onset of IGMSY. We choose this survey for the following reasons. 
The preceding demographic and health survey NFHS-3, fielded in 2005 and 2006, contains only 
state but no district identifiers. On the other hand, the latest DLHS, the DLHS-4 from 2012, 
does not cover nine major Indian states which feature prominently in our main estimation 
sample. The complementary AHS (Annual Health Survey), which covers those nine states, does 
not allow the combination of the household, woman and children’s modules. We therefore select 
the DLHS-3. While its household sample is twenty percent larger than in NFHS-4, it contains 
no information on child anthropometrics and no comparable information about Anganwadi 
service use, and vaccinations as well as mortality are recorded for children only up to three 
years of age instead of five as in the NFHS-4. More precisely, DLHS-3 contains only the birth 
cohorts 2004, 2005 and 2006, while the cohorts 2010-2016 are featured in NFHS-4. In parallel 
to our main estimations, where the oldest two cohorts featured by the survey constitute the 
ineligible children in treated districts, we use the oldest two cohorts in DLHS-3 for this purpose 
– which leaves us with only the 2006 cohort as placebo-eligible children.  
Table 6: Program effect on child health and mortality 
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Descriptive statistics for the placebo sample are set out in Table A7 in the appendix and the 
estimation results in Table 7. Consistent with the relatively large sample size in DLHS-3 and 
a higher fertility rate in the 2000s compared to the 2010s, there are around 25 percent more 
observations in the placebo than in our main sample. Among the five outcomes there is a single 
one, DPT-3, which is negative and borderline significant. However, the p-value equals merely 
0.22 when accounting for multiple inference. We conclude that our research design passes 
muster in terms of this placebo test. 
 
As discussed in section 3, some children born between June and December 2011 may have 
profited early from the program, leading to an underestimation of the program effect. To test 
whether the definition of treated cohorts influences our results, we exclude children that could 
have potentially benefited from the program (those born June to December 2011) from the 
control group. While this reduces contamination of the control group, it renders the treatment 
and control group in our research design slightly less comparable, e.g. regarding age. As 
expected, the magnitude of the point estimates in Tables A9 to A13 overall increases for most 
outcomes. In particular, IGMSY’s effect on child mortality now becomes significant at the one 
percent level even when accounting for multiple inference. On the other hand, the coefficient 
for underweight drops to almost half of its previous value and becomes insignificant at 
conventional levels. Due to this sensitivity, we judge our previous finding regarding 
underweight as less robust. 
Table 7: Placebo test with DLHS-3 data (children born between 2004 and 2006) 
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Finally, we conduct two robustness checks to assess whether our results are sensitive to the 
functional form of the estimating equation and the inclusion of control variables. First, we 
estimate equation (1) without control variables and second, we employ a logit instead of a 
linear probability model.11 The results are set out in Tables A14 to A18 and A19 to A22, 
respectively. They are all very similar to the ones reported in Tables 2 through 6. 
 
5.3  Magnitude of effects and cost-effectiveness  
According to our theory of change, a maternal CCT’s effect on birth spacing is ambiguous. 
Yet, we document a large decrease in birth hazard rates for second-born children. Within our 
complete set of findings, the most likely explanation for this is the increased interaction of 
mothers with Anganwadi workers, who also conduct family-planning counseling. Our finding 
is in line with Ghosh and Kochar’s (2018) results for IGMSY in two districts of Bihar. On the 
other hand, they contrast the findings of Powell-Jackson et al. (2015) for the JSY program, 
which does not incentivize such trainings or interactions with Anganwadi workers. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that improved access to the government health system 
combined with counseling is effective for reducing fertility. 
Regarding maternal health, the relatively large beneficial but statistically insignificant effect 
on mothers’ underweight is consistent with our theory of change. A limitation of our analysis 
in this context is that any moderately-sized instantaneous effects of a perinatal CCT program 
on maternal health may be too short-lived to be detectable at the time of the survey interview, 
three to five years after program participation.  
Regarding immunization, it is remarkable that there are only insignificant effects on individual 
vaccinations, while full vaccination rates increase by a sizable nine percent. This suggests that 
the more frequent contacts with the health system have particularly important orchestration 
effects, helping parents to complete a comprehensive vaccination schedule. Given a 
recommended 95 percent coverage goal and the vaccination rates in our sample before the onset 
of IGMSY, the program has the potential to close India’s immunization gap by 7 percent.  
Perhaps our most remarkable finding is the 14 percent increase in interactions with local public 
health centers three to five years subsequent to delivery, which suggests that a perinatal CCT 
can be long-term effective regarding access to maternal and child health care. Taken together, 
our results regarding Anganwadi interactions and immunization suggest that health service use 
significantly expanded through IGMSY, consistent with findings reported in the meta-analysis 
of Ranganathan and Lagarde (2012) for other geographical contexts. While we cannot isolate 
the channels by which these improvements occur, they are likely due to an orchestration of 
increased health-services demand triggered by the program conditions and expanded health 
service supply associated with IGMSY.   
                                                          
11 While Ai and Norton (2003) argue against logit models with interaction terms, Kahn-Lang and Lang 
(2020) show that a double-difference logit model can be justified if it captures the correct functional 
form of the data-generating process. 
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Taken together we cannot conclude that IGMSY has had any transformative impacts on child 
health markers. On the one hand, while there are some indications of improvements in 
children’s weight-related outcomes, the respective estimates suffer from a lack of robustness. 
On the other hand, we find no improvements for two other markers recorded three to five years 
after program benefits have elapsed, anemia and stunting. These patterns are consistent with 
Rivera et al.’s (2004) evaluation of Mexico’s Progresa program as well as a meta-study of CCTs 
in other country contexts by Manley et al. (2013) and perhaps not surprising given the rather 
small magnitude of changes in health inputs during infancy of no more than five percentage 
points.  
While a full cost-benefit analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, we present some simple 
back-of-the-envelope calculations of the program’s cost-effectiveness with respect to two 
outcomes, immunization and underweight. We put these estimates into perspective by 
comparing them to the cost-effectiveness of a vaccination intervention in India (Banerjee et 
al., (2010) and another CCT program, the Nicaraguan Red de Protecciòn Social, evaluated by 
Maluccio and Flores (2005). The estimated cost per additional fully immunized child in 
IGMSY/PMMVY amounts to ₹ 49,906 (659.88 US$).12 These costs are excessive compared to 
Banerjee et al. (2010), who estimate the costs for non-cash incentives and recruiting per fully 
immunized child in their study at ₹ 2,011. The discrepancy is not surprising, given that a 
policy tailored to improve a particular indicator should be more cost-effective than a cash 
transfer, which can be spent in a number of ways and may improve a range of indicators, albeit 
each one only to a limited extent (Banerjee et al. 2019). Moreover, average treatment effects 
as estimated by Banerjee et al. (2010) usually surpass intent-to-treat effects such as ours. A 
rough estimate based on Maluccio and Flores’ (2005) findings regarding the Nicaraguan CCT 
arrives at US$ 6,161.29 per child lifted out of underweight. This estimate is three times larger 
than our estimated cost of ₹ 71,571.49 (US$ 2,282.47) per child prevented from being 
underweight by IGMSY, suggesting a favorable performance of India’s program regarding this 
outcome.  
 
5.4  A closer look at immunization 
In our exploration of potential differences in program effects for different population sub-
groups, we focus on one of the two outcomes for which we find the most robust effects, full 
immunization. We estimate heterogeneous program effects on vaccination by child and 
household characteristics as well as the intensity of program implementation. The p-values of 
the differences in the estimated treatment effects across subsamples are adjusted for multiple 
inference with Benjamini and Hochberg’s method (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995). Table 8 
contains IGMSY’s effect on vaccination rates for various sample splits and the differences 
                                                          
12 See appendix A3 for the cost-effectiveness calculation. 
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Table 8: Heterogeneous program effects on complete vaccination 
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between the corresponding subsamples. While the coefficients between wealthy and poorer 
households differ only slightly, the coefficients for children of the first two birth orders, girls 
and children living in SC/ST and rural households are much larger in magnitude than those 
for the respective complimentary group. The same applies to states with a high program 
intensity, which we define by an above-median (Rs 1,578) expenditure per eligible case in 2012 
and 2013 (see appendix A2 for details). In line with expectations, these results provide 
suggestive evidence that disadvantaged groups and directly targeted children benefit 
disproportionately from the program. The latter finding is also consistent with the effects on 
birth spacing between first and second-born children that we have documented and discussed 
above. However, the associated difference between the two sub-groups is borderline significant 
at conventional levels only for child’s sex. Accordingly, the program increases the incidence of 
full immunization for girls on average by 5.5 percentage points more than for boys. On the 
other hand, none of the differences between subsamples is statistically significant when 
accounting for multiple inference. Heterogeneous effects for other outcomes are displayed in 
the appendix (Tables A23 to A25). Accordingly, the pattern for mothers’ interactions with 
health-center staff around the time of the survey interview is very similar to the one just 
discussed.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the effects of the five-year long pilot phase of India's thus 
far largest conditional cash transfer program on health inputs and outcomes. Consistent with 
evidence from other countries, we find sizable, though not transformative, increases in access 
to formal health care as well as some of the incentivized health inputs. Our findings on health 
outcomes suggest improvements in children's anthropometric markers as well as mortality, but 
the limited geographical scope of the program's pilot phase puts limitations on the precision of 
these estimates. 
Conditional cash transfers have the potential to influence a broad range of behaviors, even if 
not directly incentivized. We have found important effects on birth intervals at low parities, 
in particular after a woman’s first birth. In contrast to Powell-Jackson et al. (2015), who 
document fertility increases as a consequence of a CCT for institutional deliveries, the fertility 
effects of IGMSY support the program’s broader objectives, to improve maternal and child 
health. These seemingly contradictory findings highlight the importance of implementation 
details of a CCT: while IGMSY directives explicitly mention extended birth spacing as an 
element of monetarily incentivized educational sessions, JSY’s guidelines do not. 
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A convincing explanation for the only small to moderate magnitude of the effects of this large 
program is its failure to reach out to eligible populations at large and selection into the program 
by mothers who would have sought ante- and postnatal care anyway. According to Falcao et 
al. (2015), IGMSY has reached no more than 50 to 60 percent of target populations during its 
early years. While these administrative figures are certainly upper bounds for the program’s 
actual outreach, they equal precisely the order of magnitude of key outcome variables prior to 
the program’s onset. Hence, at the extreme, there could be no effects at all if only mothers 
enrolled in the program who would have sought government healthcare even in the absence of 
the incentive. Such a pattern is more than likely given that such women face the lowest 
opportunity costs of enrolling and meeting the program conditions. This highlights the 
importance of a health-related CCT’s outreach at the intensive margin: while an expansion of 
IGMSY/PMMVY to other districts can be expected to yield moderate improvements similar 
to the ones reported here, expanding the outreach within program districts, e.g. by more active 
recruitment and awareness campaigns, promises much greater improvements regarding both 
health inputs and outcomes. 
Which lessons can be learned from our evaluation of the IGMSY pilot for its successor 
PMMVY, which has been universal since 2017? The only major difference between the two is 
PMMVY’s restriction of eligibility to a woman’s first birth, while IGMSY has covered the first 
two parities. While our data does not allow us to quantify spillover effects to younger, ineligible 
siblings, there exists evidence for two studies of parent-focused medical care and counseling 
interventions covering exclusively first-born infants in vulnerable US households. These 
document spillover effects to later-born siblings of a magnitude similar to the direct effect on 
eligible children (Ruggiero et al. 2020; Seitz and Apfel 1994). This evidence suggests that the 
effect of PMMVY on mothers’ health-system contacts, birth spacing and immunization among 
children of all parities will be similar to the effects we have documented for IGMSY. On the 
other hand, PMMVY’s budget allocation, which allows to fund no more than roughly half of 
all first births in India, makes effects larger than the ones reported here unlikely, and the main 
lessons learned from IGMSY apply to PMMVY. 
Overall, our impression of India’s maternal conditional cash transfer program 
IGMSY/PMMVY is more optimistic than Jackson-Powell et al.’s (2015) assessment of JSY, 
which focuses on institutional deliveries. Our evidence suggests that Indian policy makers have 
learned from the experiences with this earlier program and designed IGMSY/PMMVY more 
carefully. According to our findings, maternal CCTs can be an important, albeit not 
transformative element for improving access to health care and health outcomes in low- and 
middle-income countries. However, to increase their effectiveness, the problem of outreach 
among the target groups deserves more attention. 
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Appendix  
A1. Empirical approach for mothers’ outcomes  
Whether a mother is eligible is measured via a dummy variable that takes on one if the mother 
gave birth to a first or second born child after the year 2011.  
𝐻௦ௗ௧௜ = 𝛼௦ௗ + µ௧ + (δୱ  × 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔_𝑤୲)  + 𝛽(𝑃௦ௗ × 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔_𝑤௧)  + 𝛾𝑋௦ௗ௜௧  + 𝑢௦ௗ௜௧ ,                         (3) 
where subscript 𝑖 indicates mother, 𝑑 district, 𝑠 state, and t birth year of mother 
 𝐻: health outcome (underweight, anemia) 
 𝜷: ITT effect 
 𝑃: dummy for pilot program district 
 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔_𝑤 : eligibility of the mother 
 𝑋௦ௗ௜௧: control variables  
 𝛼௦ௗ : district fixed effects 
 δୱ : state fixed effects 
 µ௧: mother’s birth year fixed effects 
 𝑢௦ௗ௜௧: robust standard errors clustered at the district level 
 Sample: mothers aged at least 19 who had a first or second child between 2010 and 
2013 (in order to assure a relatively even sample split and comparability) 
 
 
A2. Measure of program implementation 
In order to detect heterogeneous program effects by intensity of implementation, we use each 
state’s disbursements per potentially eligible woman between 2011 and 2014 under IGMSY. 
For state-wise program expenditures we draw on data from Falcao et al. (2015). We define the 
number of eligible cases in each state by calculating the state-wise share of first and second 
births of mothers aged at least nineteen years old in pilot districts (years 2012 and 2013) in 
the overall number of births for the same period using NFHS – 4 data and then multiplying it 
with the Indian population (in thousands) and the Indian birthrate (sourced from World Bank 
(2019)). The share of eligible children in all births in pilot districts is roughly 65 percent. A 
state is considered a high implementation state if it has an above-median (₹ 1,578) expenditure 
per eligible case in 2012 and 2013. We choose this measure instead of the state-wise number of 
beneficiaries reported by the government since our measure is more strongly correlated with 
survey measures of program coverage from Niti Aayog and DMEO (2017). Moreover, it 
corresponds more closely to the ITT effects we are estimating.  
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A3. Cost effectiveness calculation 
 
The cost effectiveness of the intervention was estimated as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒  2012 −  2013/14
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛  (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)
 
 
For a description of how we arrive at the yearly expenditure per eligible case, see A2.  
Maluccio and Flores (2005) find a 6.2 percentage point reduction in underweight (ITT-effect) 
and their reported average value of received direct cash transfer and health related in-kind 
benefits per year amount in total to US$ 382 per child. Note that this cost estimate does not 
include administrative costs for running the program, as does our estimated cost for IGMSY. 
 
A4.  Additional tables 
Table A1: Timing of conditions and cash transfer disbursement in IGMSY 
Install-
ment 
Timing of 
disbursement 
Amount Conditions 
2011-2013 
1 At the end of 
six months of 
pregnancy 
1500 (1) Pregnancy registered within four months at the 
Anganwadi Center (AWC) or Health Center 
(2) Mother participated in min. one antenatal check-up 
(3) Mother picked up IFA tablets 
(4) Mother received at least one tetanus vaccination 
(5) Mother attended a nutrition and health counseling at 
least once 
 
2 At the end of 
three months 
after delivery 
1500 (6) Child birth is registered 
(7) Child has received Polio 0 and BCG vaccination 
(8) Child has received Polio-1 and DPT-1 vaccination  
(9) Child has received Polio-2 and DPT-2 vaccination 
(10) Child has been weighed at least twice since birth 
(11) After  delivery,  mother  participated in at  least  two  
infant and young child feeding (IYCF) counseling  
meetings  
  
3 At the end of  
six months 
after delivery 
1000 (12) Child  has  been  exclusively  breastfed  for  first  six  
months,  unless  advised otherwise  by  a medical 
doctor 
(13) After six months, the child has been started to be fed 
complementary foods 
(14) Child has received Polio-3 and DPT-3 vaccination  
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(15) Child has been weighed at least twice between three 
and six months 
(16) Between three and six months after birth the mother  
participated in at  least  two  infant and young child 
feeding (IYCF) counseling  meetings   
 
With increase of transfer amount in 2013 
1 At the end of  
six months of 
pregnancy 
3000 (1) Pregnancy registered 
(2) Mother participated in at least two antenatal care visits 
where she received iron and folic acid tablets and 
tetanus vaccination 
2 At the end of  
six months 
after delivery 
3000 (3) Child birth is registered 
(4) Child is immunized against BCG, Polio 1-3 and DPT 1-
3  
(5) In the first three months after delivery, mother 
participates in at least three IYCF meetings and had 
the child’s growth measured at least three times 
(6) Mother exclusively breastfeeds for six months, 
afterwards child is introduced to complimentary food 
Notes: sources: Ministry of Women and Child Development (2011) and Niti Aayog and 
DMEO (2017)
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Table A2: Ranking of index scores of pilot and matched control districts 
34 
 
Table A3: Data restrictions and number of observations 
Restriction 
N 
children 
Original dataset (NFHS-4, children schedule) 259,627 
Excluding UTs  252,064 
Restricted to program and control districts 32,741 
Excluding states with other maternity programs 26,573 
Excluding Jammu and Kashmir 25,170 
Restricted to children of mothers who were at least 19 at the birth 
of the respective child 23,762 
Restricted to children born between 2010 and 2013 14,721 
Restricted to observations for which data is available for at least 
one main outcome 14,721 
Restricted to observations for which data is available for all 
controls  13,897 
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Table A4: Description of variables 
Unit of 
observati
on 
Variable Description Source 
Outcome variables 
Child Anemia Dummy variable, equals one if the child has mild, severe or moderate anemia 
(hemoglobin level below 11 g/dl) 
Generated from  
NFHS-4 
 Birth spacing Succeeding birth interval in months (if birth interval missing but a birth took 
place after the respective child: months since last birth of mother) 
Generated from  
NFHS-4 
Child BCG Dummy variable, equals one if a child has been administered the Bacillus-
Calmette-Guèrin-vaccination. Following standard DHS procedure, “Don’t know” 
is recoded to  “No” for all vaccinations 
NFHS-4 
Child Complete 
vaccination 
Dummy variable, equals one if the child has been administered one BCG, one 
measles, three DPT and three polio doses 
 
Child DPT-3 Dummy variable, equals one if child has been administered the last combined 
diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus vaccination dose 
NFHS-4 
Child Low birth 
weight 
Dummy variable, equals one if weight at birth lies below 2.5 kg Calculated from 
NFHS-4 
Child Measles Dummy variable, equals one if the child has been administered one measles dose NFHS-4 
Child Mortality Dummy variable, equals one if the child has perished Calculated from 
NFHS-4 
Child Polio-3 Dummy variable, equals one if child has been administered the last polio 
vaccination dose 
 
Child Stunted Dummy variable, equals one if the height for age z-score (using the WHO 
reference population) (HAZ) lies below -2. The HAZ is equal to the number of 
NFHS-4 
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standard deviations below or above the reference median  and calculated as 
follows:  
(observed height/age) – (median height/age of the reference population) / 
standard deviation  of the reference population 
Child Underweight Dummy variable, equals one if weight for age z-score (using the WHO reference 
population) (WAZ) below -2 
NFHS-4 
 
Mother Anemia Dummy variable, equals one if the mother has mild, severe or moderate anemia 
(hemoglobin level below 11 g/dl for pregnant women and below 12 g/dl for all 
other adult women) 
Generated from  
NFHS-4 
Mother  Underweight Dummy variable, equals one if Body Mass Index lies below 18.5  
 
NFHS-4 
Control variables and variables employed for heterogeneous effects estimation 
Child Birth order Birth order of the child NFHS-4 
Child Sex Dummy variable, equals one if the child is female NFHS-4 
Mother Age Age in years NFHS-4 
Mother Educational 
level 
Woman’s highest educational level. Consists of the following categories: no 
education, primary education, secondary education, higher education 
NFHS-4 
Mother Height Height in cm NFHS-4 
Mother Marital status Marital status of the mother, consists of the following categories: never in union, 
married, widowed/separated 
Generated from 
NFHS-4 
Mother Squared age Squared age in years Calculated from 
NFHS-4 
Household Poor Dummy variable, equals one if a household belongs to the poorest 40% in the 
NFHS-4 sample in terms of the wealth index 
NFHS-4 
Household Rural  Dummy variable, equals one if the place of residence lies in a rural area NFHS-4 
Household Religion Religion of the household. Consists of the following categories: Hindu, Muslim, 
Christian, Sikh, Buddhist, no or other religion 
Generated fom 
NFHS-4 
Household SC/ST Dummy variable, equals one if household belongs to a scheduled caste or tribe Generated from 
NFHS-4 
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Household Wealth  Quintiles of a continuous measure of relative wealth of a household equal to the 
factor score of an index of owned assets (range of index:  -2.25822 to 2.86687) 
NFHS-4 
State State 
implementation 
Dummy variable, equals one for states with average IGMSY expenditure 
between 2011-2014  per eligible case above the median (eligible are first and 
second born children of mothers at least 19 at birth in pilot districts) 
Generated from 
expenditure 
(Falcao et al. 
(2015)) and  
population data 
(World Bank 
(2019)), NFHS-4 
Treatment and eligibility variables 
Child Birth year 2012 
or later 
(Elig_birth) 
Dummy variable, equals one if child was born in 2012 or later Generated from 
NFHS-4 
District Program district Dummy variable, equals one for districts in which IGMSY was implemented in 
2011. The variable equals zero if the district is a control district (district which 
is nearest neighbor in terms of the maternity and child health index score used 
for selection of pilot districts, in the same state) 
Pilot districts 
(Ministry of Women 
and Child 
Development 2019), 
control districts 
matched by authors 
 
Mean SD N
Outcome variables (child)
Succeeding birth interval (median) 33.00 12.42 13897
Anganwadi contact
AWC benefits during pregnancy (%) 56.82 49.53 13886
AWC benefits during breastfeeding (%) 51.73 49.97 13854
AWC benefits in last 12 months (child) (%) 56.32 49.60 13308
Mother saw AWW in last 3 months (%) 44.44 49.69 13897
Vaccination
BCG vaccinated (%) 91.30 28.18 13308
DPT-3 vaccinated (%) 81.25 39.03 13308
Polio-3 vaccinated (%) 72.29 44.76 13308
Measles vaccinated (%) 84.60 36.10 13308
Complete vaccination (%) 63.76 48.07 13308
Health
Low birth weight (%) 13.60 34.28 13308
Underweight (%) 37.95 48.53 12390
Stunted (%) 40.80 49.15 12390
Anemic (%) 55.68 49.68 12523
Mortality (%) 4.41 20.53 13897
Child characteristics
Female (%) 47.54 49.94 13897
Age (months) 40.17 11.61 13125
Mother characteristics
Height (cm) 151.40 6.13 13897
Age (years) 28.05 4.79 13897
Education
None (%) 32.96 47.01 13897
Primary (%) 14.28 34.99 13897
Secondary (%) 42.24 49.40 13897
Higher (%) 10.52 30.68 13897
Household characteristics
Notes: Underweight: BMI below 18.5. Anemic: hemoglobin level below 11 g/dl,  below 12 g/dl for pregnant women. Wealth index quintiles included in NFHS-4 (derived from the factor score of principal component analysis of a household asset index). SC/ST indicates whether the child's household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Tribe. Summary statistics are based on data from NFHS-4 and constructed using state mother/child sampling weights provided by NFHS-4. Sample: mothers aged at least 19 with a first or second child born between 2010 and 2013, 70 districts. 72.65 44.57 13897
SC/ST (%) 34.35 47.49 13897
Religion
Hindu (%) 80.40 39.70 13897
Muslim (%) 13.91 34.61 13897
Christian (%) 2.78 16.43 13897
Sikh (%) 2.05 14.18 13897
Buddhist (%) 0.22 4.72 13897
None or other religion (%) 0.63 7.92 13897
Wealth quintile
First (%) 26.51 44.14 13897
Second (%) 20.96 40.71 13897
Third (%) 18.74 39.03 13897
Fourth (%) 18.05 38.46 13897
Fifth (%) 15.74 36.42 13897
Eligibility variable
Born 2012 or later (share) 0.65 0.48 13897
Notes: AWC benefit: received goods or services from Anganwadi center. DPT-3: child completed the third diphteria,
pertussis and tetanus vaccination. BCG: child completed the Bacillus Calmette-Guèrin vaccination (primarily
employed against tuberculosis). Polio-3: child completed the third polio vaccination. Wealth index quintiles included
in NFHS-4 (derived from the factor score of principal component analysis of a household asset index). SC/ST
indicates whether the child's household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Tribe. Summary statistics are based on data
from NFHS-4 and constructed using state mother/child sampling weights provided by NFHS-4. Sample: Children
born 2010-2013 to mothers aged at least 19 at birth of child, 70 districts. 
Table A5: Summary statistics NFHS-4 (Children, full sample)
Mean SD N
Outcome variables (mother)
Underweight (%) 20.23 40.18 14881
Anemia (%) 57.89 49.37 14807
Mother characteristics
Age (years) 28.64 6.13 14807
Education
None (%) 23.76 42.56 14807
Primary (%) 13.13 33.77 14807
Secondary (%) 48.69 49.98 14807
Higher (%) 14.43 35.14 14807
Marital status
Married (%) 95.66 20.37 14807
Never in union (%) 0.11 3.36 14807
Widowed or separated (%) 4.23 20.12 14807
Household characteristics
Rural (%) 65.41 47.57 14807
SC/ST (%) 32.04 46.66 14807
Religion
Hindu (%) 82.80 37.74 14807
Muslim (%) 10.42 30.55 14807
Christian (%) 2.82 16.57 14807
Sikh (%) 2.82 16.55 14807
Buddhist (%) 0.29 5.38 14807
None or other (%) 0.85 9.19 14807
Wealth quintile
First (%) 18.12 38.52 14807
Second (%) 18.22 38.60 14807
Third (%) 19.25 39.43 14807
Fourth (%) 21.48 41.07 14807
Fifth (%) 22.93 42.04 14807
Eligibility variable
Gave birth to first or second child in 2012 or later (share) 0.52 0.50 14807
Notes: Underweight: BMI below 18.5. Anemic: hemoglobin level below 12 g/dl, below 11 g/dl for
pregnant women. Wealth index quintiles included in NFHS-4 (derived from the factor score of
principal component analysis of a household asset index). SC/ST indicates whether the child's
household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Tribe. Summary statistics are based on data from NFHS-4
and constructed using state mother/child sampling weights provided by NFHS-4. Sample: mothers
aged at least 19 with a first or second child born between 2010 and 2013, 70 districts. 
Table A6: Summary statistics NFHS-4 (Mothers, full sample)
Mean SD N
Outcome variables (child)
Vaccination
BCG vaccinated (%) 82.00 38.42 17990
DPT-3 vaccinated (%) 64.16 47.96 17990
Polio-3 vaccinated (%) 58.99 49.19 17990
Measles vaccinated (%) 74.38 43.66 17990
Complete vaccination (%) 51.51 49.98 17990
Health
Mortality (%) 3.62 18.67 18676
Child characteristics
Female (%) 47.55 49.94 18676
Mother characteristics
Age (years) 27.52 4.87 18676
Education
No education (%) 39.09 48.80 18676
Primary education (%) 31.18 46.32 18676
Secondary education (%) 15.57 36.26 18676
Higher education (%) 14.16 34.86 18676
Household characteristics
Rural (%) 69.81 45.91 18676
SC/ST (%) 42.14 49.38 18676
Religion
Hindu (%) 68.65 46.39 18676
Muslim (%) 11.86 32.33 18676
Christian (%) 11.58 32.00 18676
Sikh (%) 4.30 20.28 18676
Buddhist (%) 1.82 13.36 18676
None or other religion (%) 1.79 13.26 18676
Wealth quintile
First 23.52 42.42 18676
Second 19.34 39.50 18676
Third 19.08 39.30 18676
Fourth 18.71 39.00 18676
Fifth 19.34 39.50 18676
Eligibility variable
Born 2005 or later (share) 0.72 0.45 18676
Notes: DPT-3: child completed the third diphteria, pertussis and tetanus vaccination. BCG: child
completed the Bacillus Calmette-Guèrin vaccination (primarily employed against tuberculosis). Polio-
3: child completed the third polio vaccination. Wealth index quintiles derived from the factor score
of principal component analysis of the DLHS-3 household asset index. SC/ST indicates whether the
child's household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Tribe. Summary statistics are based on data from
DLHS-3 and constructed using state mother/child sampling weights provided by DLHS-3. Sample:
Children born 2004-2006 to mothers aged at least 19 at birth of child, 70 districts. 
Table A7: Summary statistics DLHS-3
Years of residence
(1)
Program district x eligible mother 0.28
0.88
Control mean (years) 13.56
Observations 14,917
Clusters 70
Notes: The dependent variable are years of residence. Eligible mother equals one if
the mother gave birth to a first or second born child in 2012 or later. Program 
district is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a woman lives in a district where
IGMSY was active from 2011 onward. Additional controls included but not
reported in the table are educational level, marriage status, religion, wealth index
factor score of the household, and whether the household belongs to a Scheduled
Caste or Tribe and is situated in a rural area respectively. Sample: mothers aged at
least 19 with first or second children born between 2010 and 2013. All estimates are
computed using sampling weights, district fixed effects, mother's birth year fixed
effects and child-cohort specific state fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at the district level in parentheses.
 * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Table A8: Program effect on years of residence
Sample split  by: 
Full sample First born Second born Third or higher
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Program district x birth year 2012 or later 0.89** 0.86 0.79* 1.08
(0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.15)
{0.24} {0.16} {0.59}
Control median birth interval (months) 42.2 36.0 44.6 46.2
Observations 11407 3987 3666 3754
Clusters 70 70 70 70
Birth order
Note: see table 2. Sample: children born 2010-2013 (excluding children born June-December 2011) to mothers
aged at least 19 at birth of child.
 * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Table A9: Program effect on birth spacing  (excluding children born June-December 2011)
Underweight Anemia
(1) (2)
Program district x eligible mother -1.90 -0.10
(1.28) (1.57)
{0.25} {0.95}
Control mean (percent) 17 56
Observations 14489 14414
Clusters 70 70
Note: see table 3. Sample: mothers aged at least 19 at birth of a first or second child born
between 2010 and 2013 in the 70 districts of our research design (excluding mothers with
first and (if applicable) second child born June-December 2011).
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Table A10: Program effect on mothers' health (excluding children born June-December 2011)
Prenatal benefits 
mother
Postnatal benefits 
mother
Mother met AWW 
last 3 months
Child benefits in 
last 12 months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1.85 0.97 5.56*** 0.91
(1.26) (1.35) (1.08) (1.27)
{0.31} {0.71} {0.00} {0.71}
Control mean (percent) 52.4 48.0 40.3 49.2
Observations 13886 13854 13897 13308
Clusters 70 70 70 70
Program district x birth year 2012 or later
Notes: see table 4. Sample: children born 2010-2013 (excluding children born June-December 2011) to mothers aged at least 19
at birth of child.
 * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Table A11: Program effect on Anganwadi service use - Excluding children born June-December 2011
Complete vacc.
BCG DPT-3 Polio-3 Measles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.93 1.53 2.58** 1.11 5.31***
(1.15) (1.68) (1.28) (1.38) (1.56)
{0.60} {0.60} {0.12} {0.60}
Control mean (percent) 90.3 79.6 67.5 83.8 59.1
Observations 13308 13308 13308 13308 13308
Clusters 70 70 70 70 70
Table A12: Program effect on vaccination (excluding children born June-December 2011)
Program district x birth year 2012 or later
Notes: see table 5. Sample: children born 2010-2013 (excluding children born June-December 2011) to mothers aged at least
19 at birth of child.
 * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Vaccinations by type
Mortality
Low birth weight Underweight Stunting Anemia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-4.78** -2.82 2.46 3.81 -2.05***
(1.90) (2.07) (3.39) (2.46) (0.63)
{0.05} {0.29} {0.50} {0.29} {0.01}
Control mean (percent) 10.0 38.6 41.1 46.8 3.0
Observations 10920 10146 10146 10281 11407
Clusters 70 70 70 70 70
Table A13: Program effect on child health and mortality (excluding children born June-December 2011)
Program district x birth year 2012 or later
Notes see table 6. Sample: children born 2010-2013 (excluding children born June-December 2011) to mothers aged at least 19 at birth
of child.
 * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Health outcomes
Sample split  by: 
Full sample First born Second born Third or higher
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.97 0.82*** 0.82*** 1.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
{0.01} {0.97} {0.85}
Control median birth interval (months) 40.6 35.8 42.3
Observations 13897 4880 4502
Clusters 70 70 70
Birth order
Notes:  see table 2. Without additional control variables.
 * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Table A14: Program effect on birth spacing (without additional controls)
Program district x birth year 2012 or later
Underweight Anemia
(1) (2)
Program district x eligible mother -1.49 -0.47
(1.15) (1.52)
{0.34} {0.75}
Control mean (percent) 17 56
Observations 15500 15417
Clusters 70 70
Notes : see table 3. Without additional control variables.
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Table A15: Program effect on mothers' health (without additional controls)
Prenatal benefits 
mother
Postnatal benefits 
mother
Mother met AWW 
last 3 months
Child benefits in last 
12 months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1.69 0.76 5.25*** 0.82
(1.37) (1.44) (1.10) (1.30)
{0.44} {0.76} {0.00} {0.76}
Control mean (percent) 52.4 48.0 40.3 49.2
Observations 13886 13854 13897 13308
Clusters 70 70 70 70
Table A16: Program effect on Anganwadi service use (without additional controls)
Program district x birth year 2012 or later
Notes: see table 4. Without additional control variables.
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Complete vacc.
BCG DPT-3 Polio-3 Measles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.90 1.51 2.49* 1.08 5.22***
(1.08) (1.57) (1.33) (1.24) (1.57)
{0.58} {0.58} {0.17} {0.58}
Control mean (percent) 90.3 79.6 67.5 83.8 59.1
Observations 13308 13308 13308 13308 13308
Clusters 70 70 70 70 70
Table A17: Program effect on vaccination (without additional controls)
Program district x birth year 2012 or 
later
Vaccinations by type
Notes:  see table 5. Without additional control variables.
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Mortality
Low birth weight Underweight Stunting Anemia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-3.96*** -4.86*** 0.17 3.61* -1.04*
(1.20) (1.62) (2.06) (1.89) (0.53)
{0.01} {0.01} {0.93} {0.14} {0.14}
Control mean (percent) 10.0 36.6 38.9 47.5 3.7
Observations 13308 12390 12390 12523 13897
Clusters 70 70 70 70 70
Table A18: Program effect on child health and mortality (without additional controls)
Health outcomes
Program district x birth year 2012 or later
Notes: see table 6. Without additional control variables.
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Table A19: Program effect on mothers' health (Logit model)
Underweight Anemia
(1) (2)
Program district x eligible mother -1.91 -0.25
(1.30) (1.48)
Control mean (percent) 16.73 56.03
Observations 14772 14807
Clusters 69 70
Notes : see table 3. Average marginal effects of Logit model. Coefficients
multiplied by 100 for comparability with linear probability model.
Differences in observations to LPM model arise from some instances of
perfect prediction. Computation of multiple inference adjusted p-values in
logit model not possible due to large number of fixed effects. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Prenatal benefits 
mother
Postnatal benefits 
mother
Mother met AWW 
last 3 months
Child benefits in 
last 12 months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1.95* 1.46 4.50*** 0.91
(1.12) (1.27) (1.02) (1.37)
Control mean (percent) 13886 13854 13897 13308
Observations 70 70 70 70
Clusters 13886 13854 13897 13308
Notes: see table 4. Average marginal effects of Logit model. Coefficients multiplied by 100 for comparability with linear
probability model. Differences in observations to LPM model arise from some instances of perfect prediction. Computation of
multiple inference adjusted p-values in logit model not possible due to large number of fixed effects. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Program district x birth year 2012 or 
later
Table A20: Program effect on Anganwadi service use (Logit model)
Complete Vacc.
BCG DPT-3 Polio-3 Measles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.73 1.09 2.73** 0.96 5.22***
(1.22) (1.55) (1.23) (1.35) (1.52)
Control mean (percent) 90.3 79.6 67.5 83.8 59.1
Observations 12825 13308 13308 13308 13308
Clusters 66 70 70 70 70
Table A21: Program effect on vaccinations (Logit model)
Program district x birth year 2012 or later
Notes: see table 5. Average marginal effects of Logit model. Coefficients multiplied by 100 for comparability with linear probability
model. Differences in observations to LPM model arise from some instances of perfect prediction. Computation of multiple inference
adjusted p-values in logit model not possible due to large number of fixed effects. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Vaccinations by Type
Mortality
Low birth weight Underweight Stunting Anemia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-4.45*** -4.52*** 0.64 4.06** -0.88
(1.13) (1.66) (2.12) (1.88) (0.66)
Control mean (percent) 10.0 36.6 38.9 47.5 3.7
Observations 13308 12390 12390 12523 13799
Clusters 70 70 70 70 69
Table A22: Program effect on child health and mortality (Logit model)
Program district x birth year 2012 or 
later
Notes: see table 6. Average marginal effects of Logit model. Coefficients multiplied by 100 for comparability with linear probability model.
Differences in observations to LPM model arise from some instances of perfect prediction. Computation of multiple inference adjusted p-
values in logit model not possible due to large number of fixed effects. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Health outcomes
Sample split by:
                         
                         First/second Third/higher Female Male Bottom 40%Upper 60% SC/ST Other Rural Urban Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
6.00*** 2.39 6.22*** 5.01** 4.33** 5.99*** 5.40*** 5.26*** 4.98*** -1.02 7.72*** 3.90**
(1.67) (2.77) (2.02) (2.08) (1.88) (2.00) (1.86) (1.78) (1.51) (4.26) (1.82) (1.48)
Difference
                         
Control mean (percent)   41.1 40.3 44.8 37.4 47.4 34.6 44.8 38.8 45.8 27.0 44.8 42.3
Observations 9382 4515 6734 7163 6891 7006 6173 7724 10753 3144 6812 6799
Clusters 70 70 70 70 69 70 70 68 67 70 34 34
Table A23: Heterogeneous program effects on Anganwadi service use
Individual and household characteristics Intensity of program 
implementation (by state)Birth order Sex Wealth Social group Residence
Program district x birth 
year 2012 or later
3.85 1.21 -1.66 0.29 -3.80
[0.31] [0.73] [0.60] [0.92] [0.21] [0.10]
6.06
Notes: See table 8. Outcome is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the mother met an Anganwadi worker in the three months before the survey interview.
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
{0.922} {0.922} {0.922} {0.922} {0.922}
Sample split by:
                         
                         First/second Third/higher Female Male Bottom 40%Upper 60% SC/ST Other Rural Urban Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-5.91*** 0.21 -3.17** -5.03** -1.03 -6.35*** -0.94 -5.07*** -3.69*** -5.26 -5.68** -4.06**
(1.54) (1.83) (1.48) (2.17) (1.22) (1.79) (1.85) (1.47) (1.10) (3.61) (2.15) (1.56)
Difference
                         
Control mean (percent)   13.8 7.9 12.0 12.0 9.1 14.6 11.5 12.3 10.9 15.0 10.7 12.8
Observations 9016 4292 6476 6832 6536 6772 5888 7420 10257 3051 6515 6510
Clusters 70 70 70 70 69 70 70 68 67 70 34 34
Table A24: Heterogeneous program effects on low birth weight
Intensity of program 
implementation (by state)Birth order Sex Wealth Social group Residence
Individual and household characteristics
Program district x birth 
year 2012 or later
-5.86 1.85 5.33 3.94 1.53
[0.02] [0.52] [0.02] [0.12] [0.68] [0.56]
1.42
{0.064} {0.684} {0.064} {0.351} {0.684}
Notes : see table 8. Outcome is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a child is born with a weight of less than 2.5 kg.
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Sample split by:
                         
                         First/second Third/higher Female Male Bottom 40%Upper 60% SC/ST Other Rural Urban Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-5.49*** -2.70 -2.76 -5.95** -7.41** -2.25 -9.05*** -1.91 -4.82** -5.55 -7.00* -2.68
(1.68) (3.22) (2.95) (2.35) (3.00) (2.30) (3.02) (1.80) (2.11) (4.07) (3.45) (2.12)
Difference
                         
Control mean (percent)   35.1 44.2 41.7 34.7 47.2 29.3 41.4 36.2 40.7 30.4 34.6 41.6
Observations 8381 4009 6013 6377 6096 6294 5473 6917 9566 2824 6100 6029
Clusters 70 70 70 70 69 70 70 68 67 70 34 34
Table A25: Heterogeneous program effects on underweight
Notes : see table 8. Outcome is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a child is underweight (WAZ below -2).
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
{0.844} {0.844} {0.648} {0.205} {0.888}
4.16
[0.35] [0.42] [0.16] [0.04] [0.89] [0.29]
0.68
Program district x birth 
year 2012 or later
-3.01 3.28 -5.15 -6.89
Individual and household characteristics Intensity of program 
implementation (by state)Birth order Sex Wealth Social group Residence
